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Abstract
This critical examination of intersectionality in the con-
text of Canadian anti- discrimination cases outlines the 
Lockean foundations of identity construction in the 
courts. By framing Jasbir Puar’s articulation of intersec-
tionality as an invitation to create more complex cartog-
raphies, the author challenges the hegemony of certain 
kinds of knowledge production in sites of institutional 
power.
Résumé
Cet examen critique de l’intersectionnalité dans le con-
texte des affaires de lutte contre la discrimination au 
Canada souligne les fondements lockiens de la con-
struction de l’identité devant les tribunaux. En formu-
lant l’articulation de l’intersectionnalité par Jasbir Puar 
comme une invitation à créer des cartographies plus 
complexes, l’auteure conteste l’hégémonie de certains 
types de production des connaissances dans les lieux de 
pouvoir institutionnel.
Introduction
It has been over 25 years since Kimberlé Wil-
liams Crenshaw (1989)  first put a name to intersec-
tionality. Since then, intersectionality has become “an 
everyday metaphor that anyone can use” to interrogate, 
and intervene in, the ways that social life is experienced, 
discussed, represented, structured, and institutional-
ized. The central idea, however, was not new at the time 
and Crenshaw herself acknowledges that: 
In every generation and in every intellectual sphere and in 
every political moment, there have been African Ameri-
can women who have articulated the need to think and 
talk about race through a lens that looks at gender, or 
think and talk about feminism through a lens that looks at 
race. (Adewumni 2014, n.p.) 
Nevertheless, in those 25 years, unlike its pre-
ceding articulations, the specific term “intersection-
ality” has not only become foundational to feminist 
theory and praxis, it has crossed borders making ap-
pearances within and in-between multiple legal juris-
dictions, theoretical planes, and geographic locations. 
By focussing my attention on the epistemological foun-
dations of the rules that govern identity formation with-
in Canadian anti-discrimination law, in this article, I 
examine issues that have received little attention in the 
literature on intersectionality. Following Jasbir Puar’s 
(2012) pivotal insight that “many of the cherished cate-
gories of the intersectional mantra … are the products 
of modernist, colonial agendas and regimes of epistem-
ic violence” (54), I argue that, without carefully exam-
ining the Lockean foundations of the concept of iden-
tity itself, the use of intersectionality in the context of 
anti-discrimination law will continue to reproduce the 
essentialism and epistemic violence that intersectional 
resistance intially sought to disrupt. 
Vrushali Patil (2013) maintains that, if cross-bor-
der dynamics are neglected and the nation’s emergence 
via transnational processes remains unproblematized, 
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“our [intersectional] analyses will remain tethered to 
the spatialities and temporalities of colonial modernity” 
(863). This important insight bears out in the context of 
Canadian anti-discrimination law. Anti-discrimination 
claims are a primary site of nation building that, despite 
pretenses to geographic particularity, simultaneously 
borrow, exchange, assimilate, and disavow the termi-
nologies and legal logics of other national jurisdictions. 
Despite previous articulations of the power relations at 
the heart of intersectional analyses in Black feminist 
thought in the U.S., intersectionality as a terminology is 
firmly rooted in the intellectual and institutional culture 
of 1980’s and 1990’s U.S. Critical Legal Studies (Cho, 
Crenshaw, and McCall 2013). Carol A. Aylward (2010) 
situates intersectionality as “an offshoot of Critical Race 
Theory which originated with Black and other scholars 
of colour who felt that existing legal discourse, includ-
ing Critical Legal Studies discourse, was alienating to all 
people of colour (3). As such, the term intersectionality 
was forged in a geographically and methodologically 
specific site of institutional power: the U.S. legal acade-
my. It also emerged in relation to a specific articulation 
of juridical power. As Crenshaw (2014) states:
…the term was used to capture the applicability of Black 
feminism to anti-discrimination law…anti-discrimina-
tion law looks at race and gender separately. The conse-
quence of that is when African American women or any 
other women of colour experience either compound or 
overlapping discrimination, the law initially just was not 
there to come to their defence (n.p.).
U.S. anti-discrimination law, including its le-
gitimating logics, its doctrinal obstacles, and its role 
in impeding or outright reversing modest law reforms 
was among the initial targets of intersectional resistance 
(Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013). This context has, 
to a certain extent, shaped its possibilities, conditioned 
its emergence, and has created certain parameters of 
intelligibility around its future potential. Its genesis as 
a juridical concept has had a significant impact on the 
ways that intersectionality has been able to cross bor-
ders and inform the drafting and implementation of an-
ti-discrimination and equality law in other parts of the 
world. This includes, but is not limited to, interpreta-
tions of both federal and provincial human rights codes 
in Canada and judicial interpretation of the equality 
provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. In the context of Canadian public policy and an-
ti-discrimination law, judges, lawyers, and legislators 
have historically and continue to borrow and codify the 
racial language and the invented taxonomies of the U.S. 
(Mawani 2011; Hodes 2013; R v. Kapp 2008). 
Contrary to Crenshaw’s initial objectives, rath-
er than appearing as a defence against discrimination, 
intersectionality as it appears on national, regional, 
and international legal and social policy landscapes 
often functions as “a tool of diversity management and 
a mantra of liberal multiculturalism” (Puar 2007, 212; 
Yuval-Davis 2006). As a result, intersectionality often 
colludes with the disciplinary apparatuses of states, re-
centers universalizing liberal essentialist identity for-
mations, seeks to harness mobility, and encases differ-
ence “within a structural container that simply wishes 
the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid” (Puar 
2007, 212). In the context of Canadian anti-discrimi-
nation law, the grounds approach provides a structur-
al container that disciplines identity into a formulaic 
grid that is populated by a series of fixed and unchang-
ing characteristics. This is not, however, only the re-
sult of the narrow interpretive frameworks produced 
in Canadian anti-discrimination cases. It is also partly 
a result of Crenshaw’s (1989) use of the categories that 
appear in U.S. anti-discrimination law as descriptive 
features of experience in the early development of the 
concept.  
The idea that race and gender, or race and sex as 
it would be articulated in the context of anti-discrimi-
nation claims, intersect to produce qualitatively differ-
ent experiences of discrimination disrupts any singular 
or universalizing category of woman (Crenshaw 1991). 
It also disupts any universalizing notions of racialized 
gender discrimination (Brah and Phoenix 2004). The 
intersecting categories, however, remain heuristic de-
vices with juridical force that pre-exist and produce 
knowledge about the experiences that they purport to 
describe. The assumed transparency of identity cate-
gories has led to explorations of the multiple ways that 
they often impose both epistemological frameworks 
and ontological presumptions when they appear both 
independently and in the context of intersectional 
frameworks (Brah and Phoenix 2004; Joseph Massad 
in Boggio Éwanjé-Épée and Magliani-Belkacem 2013; 
Mawani 2011; McClintock 1995; Puar 2012; Yuval-Da-
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vis 2006). In legal contexts, these identity categories are 
often used as discrete and static descriptive features of a 
presumed reality.  As a result, whether intersectional or 
not, the use of identity categories in Canadian anti-dis-
crimination law imposes both epistemological frame-
works and ontological presumptions. 
The problem is therefore simultaneously one of 
conceptualization and one of deployment. In its articu-
lation as a response to U.S. anti-discirmination law, in-
tersectionality takes for granted predetermined identity 
categories as they manifest in U.S. anti-discrimination 
doctrine. Similarly, when imported as a response to Ca-
nadian anti-discrimination law, intersectional analyses 
take for granted the supposed universality and trans-
parency of the predetermined identity categories that 
are listed as grounds in human rights legislation and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A closer look 
at the methods of identity construction required by the 
grounds approach in Canadian anti-discrimination law, 
however, reveals that the grounds are neither transpar-
ent nor universal. The rules that establish the content 
and meaning of the grounds transform anti-discrim-
ination claims into expressions of colonial modernity 
through the imposition of Lockean epistemological and 
ontological presumptions about the body, identity, di-
versity, and difference. 
Intersectionality and The Grounds Approach in 
Canada 
One of the key features of feminist intersection-
al analyses is the desire to decenter the unified, self-ref-
erential subjects of modernity that often appear in fem-
inist and other contexts (Brah and Phoenix 2004). Ear-
lier articulations of intersectionality, such as the Com-
bahee River Collective’s (1977) advocacy for analyses 
that recognize interlocking systems of oppression, drew 
attention to what Avtar Brah and Ann Phoenix (2004) 
refer to as “the futility of privileging a single dimension 
of experience as if it costituted the whole of life” (78). 
Unfortunately, the rules that govern how identity is ar-
ticulated in Canadian anti-discrimination law prevent 
the kinds of intersectional analyses that consider iden-
tity to be an experience that is mediated by agency, so-
cial relationships, and power relations. In this context, 
experience is not the focus. Instead, identity and the 
many categories used to describe it are the focus and 
they become sets of immutable physical characteristics 
that reduce all experience to that which can be artic-
ulated through the grounds. Identity thereby becomes 
a concrete fact of being. A closer examination of the 
concept of identity reveals that each of the categories 
that make up the grounds carry many of the universal-
izing Euro-American ontological and epistemological 
presumptions that are reflective of John Locke’s ideas 
about embodiment, difference, and diversity. It also re-
veals that identity itself is the vehicle through which the 
unified, self-referential subjects of colonial modernity 
become reified in anti-discrimination claims.
John Locke is the hinge that connects England’s 
colonial aspirations in the Americas to contemporary 
discourses around identity in judicial decisions and the 
work of legal scholars that focus on constitutional an-
ti-discrimination and equality law in both Canada and 
the United States. Locke, although never taking credit 
for the Second Treatise of Government in his lifetime, 
created within it an economic defense of English colo-
nialism in the Americas (Arneil 1996). It was also John 
Locke who was among the first to suture the concept of 
identity to human and other living beings in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. 
Philip Gleason (1983) and Radhika Mohanram 
(1999) describe how the word identity derives from the 
terminologies of logic and algebra and that it was not 
until Locke came along in the 1680s and 1690s, empha-
sizing the “the importance of categorizing identity as 
somatic sameness” or as “encapsulated within the same 
body which functions as a bag or vessel to contain life,” 
that the word identity was used to describe something 
trapped inside and/or on the body (Mohanram 1999, 
31). Locke’s texts emphasize the centrality of the body 
not only as “the scaffolding upon which identity and 
difference rest,” but they also construct the body, its 
characteristics, and its consciousness as central to civil 
state formation (31). This body, its consciousness, and 
its characteristics is emblematic of the unified, self-ref-
erential subject of colonial modernity that feminist 
analyses of interlocking systems of oppression original-
ly sought to decentre. This body is also epistemologi-
cally and ontologically presumed by the universalizing 
Euro-American identity categories that Puar (2012), 
Massad (Boggio Éwanjé-Épée and Magliani-Belkacem 
2013), and Brah and Phoenix (2004) disrupt in their 
respective analyses of identity categories and intersec-
tionality. This body, its categories, and its Lockean foun-
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dation is also central to earlier articulations of intersec-
tionality in Canadian law and public policy. 
In 1989, the year that Crenshaw’s pivotal piece 
appeared in the University of Chicago Legal Forum, the 
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women ar-
ticulated some of the same concerns that Crenshaw out-
lined in relation to U.S. anti-discrimination doctrine:
We would have liked to explore more fully the applica-
tion of the Charter guarantees to the inequality of women 
who are discriminated against because of race, disability, 
or other grounds. Unfortunately, cases that challenge the 
particular complex of disadvantage experienced by wom-
en of colour or women with disabilities, for example, are 
virtually absent from the body of decisions. So far these 
cases are simply not reaching the courts. In the few cases 
that involve poor women and Lesbian women, sex equali-
ty arguments have not been advanced ... [this] means that 
judges are not being presented with women’s unique expe-
rience of discrimination…(Brodsky and Day 1989, 4 and 
5 quoted in Aylward 2010, 3)
Although more cases have been litigated and heard in 
the courts since then, the series of overarching prob-
lems outlined here has not changed significantly nor 
has the presumed universal content of the grounds or 
the singular, unified bodies that manifest them mate-
rially.  
Kamini Steinberg (2009) shows that in practice 
the reliance on a list of discrete grounds of discrimina-
tion leads to either the privileging of one foundational 
ground as the root of the discrimination or to the cre-
ation of what a number of feminist scholars have re-
ferred to as an “additive approach” (Collins 1990; Cald-
well 1999; Yuval-Davis 2006). The additive approach 
creates a hierarchy of oppression whereby the more 
grounds that are pleaded, the more kinds of discrimi-
nation are catalogued as having taken place. Claimants 
are then seen to be doubly or triply disadvantaged. In 
the context of cases that have been pleaded under the 
equality provisions of the Charter, when intersectional 
approaches have been attempted, they have either de-
faulted to a foundational ground (see Canada (Attor-
ney General) v. Mossop 1993) or in the case of Corbiere 
v. Canada, the majority of the judges commented that 
Madame Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubé’s creation of an 
intersectional framework made her reasoning “unnec-
essarily complex” (Steinberg 2009 and Corbiere 1999, 
para. 72).
Both of these approaches to intersectionality 
maintain the discrete separability of universalizable 
identity categories. They also contradict Crenshaw’s 
(2014) later description of compound discrimination 
or forms of discrimination that cannot be addressed 
through the separation of either identity categories or 
kinds of oppression.  However, both additive approach-
es and approaches that privilege one ground, while 
contradicting Crenshaw’s description of compound 
discrimination, are also simultaneously supported by 
her claim that different kinds of discrimination can 
somehow overlap, intersect, or interlock. The language 
of overlapping, intersecting, or interlocking presuppos-
es that each ground or system of oppression pre-exists 
the discrimination as a discrete and identifiable entity 
or strand. When they come together, a new identity and 
experience is formed, but these are still dependent on 
the meanings associated with the parts that make up 
these new wholes. 
Despite the problems of insufficient analyses 
and resistance to intersectional approaches that Stein-
berg (2009) has drawn attention to in her assessment 
of the practical application of intersectionality, legal 
scholars continue to advocate for the use of intersec-
tional frameworks in the Canadian courts. Central to 
Steinberg’s thesis is the need for a more nuanced and 
holistic analysis in the Canadian courts. More recent-
ly, Sébastien Grammond (2009) has criticized Sharon 
McIvor’s challenge to Bill C-31’s 1985 amendments to 
the Indian Act for its failure to include both sex and race 
as grounds of discrimination. Grammond’s contention 
is that challenges to the rules of Indian status that do 
not consider discrimination at the intersection of sex 
and race will, and have in McIvor’s case, invite “the 
courts to embrace a truncated vision of the shortcom-
ings of the Indian Act” (425). It is important to consider 
this case in more detail here because it provides insight 
into identity formation in both Canadian courts and in 
public policy. 
The reason that Sharon McIvor brought her 
claim forward is because the amendments to the Indi-
an Act contained in Bill C-31 resulted in residual sex 
discrimination. The history of the rules of Indian status 
is long and complex, but after numerous challenges be-
ginning with those brought forward by Jeannette Cor-
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biere Lavell and Sandra Lovelace, the original rules were 
changed. Before Bill C-31, women with Indian status 
who married non-Indian men would lose their status 
whereas non-Indian women who married Indian men 
would gain status. The problem was that the Bill C-31 
amendments still maintained different eligibility rules 
for men and women.  
Under the new rules, women who had their sta-
tus restored could pass that status on to their children 
if they married someone without status. Their grand-
children, however, would not be able to pass that status 
on to their children thereby granting status to only two 
generations. Men, on the other hand, who had previ-
ously been entitled to status would have their status 
confirmed under Bill C-31. If they were married to peo-
ple without status, their partners would also have their 
status confirmed. If they had children, they too would 
be able to pass on their status as would their children’s 
children. As a result, three generations would gain sta-
tus: the men, their children, and their grandchildren 
(National Centre for First Nations Governance 2009). 
Sharon McIvor challenged this in court because 
she was told that, while she was entitled to status un-
der Bill C-31, her son, Jacob Grismer, was not because 
she traced her ancestry through the female, rather than 
the male, line. While the courts recognized the residual 
sex discrimination, the court of appeal and the federal 
government’s legislative response to that judicial deci-
sion resulted in the continuation of the same kind of 
discrimination for future generations. As Mary Eberts 
(2010), who acted as council to the Native Women’s As-
sociation of Canada in the McIvor (2009) appeal, has 
articulated:
…the Court of Appeal and Canada’s response to its deci-
sion, perpetuate and exacerbate the sorry legacy of misog-
yny deeply embedded in the Indian Act. Indeed Canada’s 
response to the McIvor case underlines, once again and 
with even more force, how inappropriate it is for the state 
to be usurping the indigenous right to determine identity, 
membership and belonging. (Eberts 2010, 16)
Cases like Sharon McIvor’s show the multiple 
ways that anti-discrimination cases, even when they are 
considered to be partial victories, maintain the found-
ing violences of settler colonialism, heteropatriachy, 
and genocide. The racialized and gendered membership 
criteria outlined in the Indian Act were historically and 
remain an assimilation strategy that promote inclusion 
through racialized and gendered legislative exclusion. 
Even if this had been a challenge to the Indian Act at 
the intersection of race and sex, it would have done 
little to remedy the discrimination due to the built in 
preference for patrilineal descent and the irremediable 
nature of a set of rules that were historically crafted as a 
way to assimilate Indigenous Peoples into the Canadian 
polity through dispossession (Stote 2015). In fact, using 
the language of race constitutes one of the many ways 
in which Canada shares the language and the invent-
ed taxonomies of the United States. Bonita Lawrence 
(2003) has outlined how race as a means of classifica-
tion reduces “diverse nations to common experiences of 
subjugation” in both countries and that “to be defined as 
a race, is synonymous with having [Indigenous] nations 
dismembered” (5). In McIvor’s case, rather than draw-
ing attention to the homogenizing, gendered forms of 
racialization that are intrinsic to the Indian Act, a claim 
based on multiple grounds may have instead further en-
trenched the racism and sexism that it sought to rectify 
because of the rules that govern identity formation in 
Canadian anti-discriminaiton law.
The quest for fixity and immutability and the 
framing of rights claims as contingent on identity is an 
essential piece of anti-discrimination doctrine in Ca-
nadian law. If making a claim under section 15 of the 
Charter or under any of the human rights codes as a 
claimant or counsel for a claimant, you must establish 
a connection to one or more of the grounds listed or 
make a successful claim for an analogous ground to be 
created in order to have a case. These criteria are some-
thing that people who are clamoring for the inclusion 
of more and more grounds should not celebrate, but 
rather be wary of for the following reasons: in order 
to establish a ground, it must first be established that 
claimants are in possession of a condition of being that 
is either not capable of, or susceptible, to change or that 
can only be changed at cost to a singular, unified iden-
tity.    
This legal ontology is very much in keeping with 
Lockean ideas of embodiment and identity. In Locke’s 
formulation, human bodies are singular and unified 
self-aware entities separable from both other humans 
and living beings due to their capacity to reason through 
abstraction and both the real and the nominal essenc-
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es used to describe them. The real essences involve at-
tributing an internal quality or structure to something 
when outwardly that quality would be invisible. The 
nominal essences are the names given to outwardly vis-
ible qualities. In the end, the real are also nominal to 
the extent that it is necessary to first perceive outward 
characteristics and on that basis attribute an internal 
structure. The nominal essences are therefore central to 
attributions of reason and to the denial of full humanity 
to those who are determined to be incapable of reason. 
The real are also nominal to the extent that human per-
ception is limited. Because human perception of bodies 
leads to the naming of those bodies according to their 
qualities – black, white, male, female—to be a species of 
a certain kind or a certain kind of member of a species 
requires common qualities. But in Locke’s Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding, the essential qualities 
possessed by living beings are not entirely accessible via 
human perception (Locke 2008, 279-304). 
While Locke may have doubted the capacity of 
human beings to perceive the essences of the body and 
doubted the existence of innate capacities of mind, he 
also argued that human perception created common 
characteristics. In this formulation, the body is what 
leads to the perception of the characteristics in question 
(Locke 2008, 279-302; Phemister 2008, xxx). For Locke, 
only observation and empirical evidence could lead to 
the removal of some qualities and substitute others in 
the refiguring of the nominal essence of any given living 
being. Therefore, living beings do not change, only our 
perceptions of them.  This is something that scientists, 
such as Charles Darwin and his contemporaries, later 
challenged–the bodies of species do change in order to 
adapt (Wilkins 2009). Mohanram (1999) also challeng-
es this assessment of the body insofar as the body ages 
and, in the process of growing older, changes consider-
ably both internally and externally over the course of 
a single life span. Nevertheless, these nominal essences 
form the basis of Locke’s system of classification of spe-
cies into groups and sub-groupings sharing common 
characteristics. The practice of representing nominal 
essences through language reifies these qualities, lead-
ing to their material manifestation and the perception 
of them as real, discrete, separable, natural, uncontest-
ed, and universal in the realm of meaning making. In 
Locke’s account of language, words stand in for ideas 
and ideas manifest materially as bodies and behaviors. 
Locke names these groupings as applied to human be-
ings: “identity and diversity” (Locke 2008, 203-218). 
In Canadian anti-discrimination law, like in the 
works of John Locke, to be in excess of an identity or 
criteria becomes a fault or an exception that must be 
rigorously examined through scientific inquiry. Iden-
tity is not therefore a quality of the body or of being 
in the world. Rather, it becomes a prison for the body 
through the denial of potentiality. In this context, iden-
tity disciplines coporeal expression and representation 
and forces the repression of any excess that cannot be 
reproduced as consistent with the nominal essences 
that are described through empirical observation and 
the establishment of ontological facts or, in the context 
of Canadian anti-discimrination law, some connection 
to the grounds.  
The contradictions inherent in Locke’s theo-
ries are consistently mirrored in judicial assessments 
of identity and in legal arguments that represent the 
identities of the people who are either party to or have 
an interest in the claim. In anti-discrimination cases, 
nominal essences are constructed as unchanging and 
potentially unchangeable reality. Yet, at the same time 
as the courts focus on the immovable fixity of identity, 
they often simultaneously question and fight over who 
will be fixed as what. As such, in this context the nom-
inal are also real, frozen in and on the body as those 
things that both transcend time, context, and the body 
and as those things that enable individual claimants to 
stand in for groups. The 1999 Supreme Court decision 
in Corbiere v. Canada is the case where the Court chose 
to define what they meant by immutable characteristics 
thereby entrenching the Lockean foundations of identi-
ty as doctrine in Canadian anti-discrimination law. The 
Corbiere decision was also where Canadian Supreme 
Court justices created their first intersectional analysis. 
In Corbiere, members of the Batchewana Indian 
Band challenged the section of the Indian Act that pro-
hibited band members who lived off reserve from vot-
ing in band elections. In this case, the Supreme Court 
took it upon itself to define immutable personal char-
acteristics as those things that “…are changeable only 
at unacceptable cost to personal identity…[or that] we 
cannot change or that the government has no legitimate 
interest in expecting us to change…” (Corbiere 1999, 5). 
They concluded that immutability could be actual, as 
in the case of race, or constructed, as in the case of reli-
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gion. The Court’s immutable characteristics, like Locke’s 
nominal essences, are considered to be physical charac-
teristics located in or on the body. In this case, the Court 
racialized non-resident members of the Batchewana In-
dian Band by creating out of them a “discrete and in-
sular minority” defined by race, residence, and unique-
ness, all of which were conceived to be immutable or 
unchangeable conditions of the body (Corbiere 1999, 9). 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé then proceeded to create 
the additive approach to intersectionality that Paulette 
Caldwell (1999), Patricia Hill Collins (1990), Kamini 
Steinberg (2010), and Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) have all 
criticized. This was done through the addition of sex to 
the analysis as opposed to a consideration of the insep-
arability or compound nature of structural factors that, 
while they affect bodies significantly, are actually exter-
nal to them. In addition, instead of a consideration of 
shared histories and the role of current government-led 
racist and sexist legislation like the section of the Indi-
an Act that was being challenged in the case, history as 
something intrinsic to them, “their history,” also be-
comes affixed to the body as a marker of difference (See 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé in Corbiere 1999, 259).
In both this case and in subsequent cases, once 
this condition of somatic sameness has been established 
through actual or constructed immutable characteris-
tics, it is applied to others who share like characteris-
tics. This way of articulating the body freezes it in time, 
place, capability, and potential as part of a set of like 
kinds. In this context, the grounds play the social role of 
Lockean nominal essences and thereby, as Patil (2013) 
forewarns, tether judicial interpretation to the spatiali-
ties and temporalities of colonial modernity. But this is 
not everything that the grounds approach shares with 
Lockean systems of classification.  
As I articulated above, Locke created a frame-
work whereby nominal essences were open to be-
ing considered creatures of perception that could be 
changed through empirical challenges to the real. The 
body may remain fixed, unchanging, and endowed with 
both real and constructed immutable characteristics in 
Corbiere v. Canada (1999), but in the context of cases 
that are pre-occupied with the veracity of the litigant’s 
immutable identity, this second feature of the Lockean 
schema plays out. This is often done by ignoring how 
the people involved in or affected by the case would 
choose to identify themselves. 
Disputes over identity that rely on the grounds 
approach often result in analyses that locate the cause of 
the discrimination in the body. In these cases, the ques-
tion periodically changes from what is the nature of the 
discrimination to what are you?  This was particular-
ly evident in Kimberley Nixon’s challenge to Vancou-
ver Rape Relief Society’s policy whereby only women 
born women could volunteer for their organization. In 
August 1995, Kimberley Nixon filed a sex discrimina-
tion complaint against Vancouver Rape Relief Society 
for denying her the opportunity to volunteer for their 
organization. Vancouver Rape Relief defended their de-
cision to reject her by arguing that because Nixon had 
been socialized as a boy growing up, she could not pro-
vide effective counseling to the cisgendered women that 
the shelter served. Nixon initially won her complaint at 
the tribunal level, but after a series of appeals, the Su-
preme Court of British Columbia reversed the tribu-
nal’s decision and ruled in favour of Vancouver Rape 
Relief. Nixon attempted to appeal to the Supeme Court 
of Canada, but they denied her leave to appeal. In the 
context of that case, at every level of court, Kimberley 
Nixon’s body either began as, or eventually became, 
the object of inquiry.  Experts were called on to explain 
gender continuums and Nixon’s birth certificate, date 
of surgery, and awareness of her gender identity were 
all brought under scrutiny.  Questions related to what it 
means to be a woman and to pass or not pass as a wom-
an were also raised at multiple levels of court (Nixon 
2000 and 2005).  
In other cases, the question changes to: what are 
they and how do their immutable characteristics result 
in my exclusion? This occurred in the context of R. v. 
Kapp (2008), a BC Pacific salmon fisheries case. In this 
case, a group of commercial fishers argued that, be-
cause Aboriginal fisheries were “race-based” fisheries, 
the commercial fishers who had been denied access to 
these fisheries for a period of 24 hours were being dis-
criminated against. In this case, not only were the bod-
ies of the Indigenous Peoples who were the beneficia-
ries of the government programs framed as the problem 
that needed to be solved, but their identities were also 
contested and variously represented at different levels 
of court as a single race, as political organizations, and 
as nations. The Crown also consistently argued that the 
commercial fishers were too diverse a group to plead on 
any of the grounds in order to get the case thrown out of 
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court. In lieu of engaging in an intersectional analysis, 
the courts determined that the occupation of commer-
cial fishing was an immutable characteristic analogous 
to race. Finally, due to the grounds requirement in s. 15 
cases, the Indigenous beneficiaries of the government 
program were reduced to a singular race, meeting the 
criteria of actual immutability at the Supreme Court of 
Canada and thereby reproducing the settler colonial vi-
olence that Lawrence (2003) describes as the dismem-
berment of Indigenous nations.
The deployment of intersectionality and the way 
that identity and its many categories are understood 
in all of these cases reveals that the grounds approach 
limits the range of what is possible. The reliance on the 
grounds and their Lockean content in Canadian an-
ti-discrimination cases thus maintains the modernist, 
colonial agendas and regimes of epistemic violence that 
Puar (2012) has identified as being central to the cher-
ished categories of the intersectional mantra. If this is 
the case, then what new possibilities might emerge from 
this analysis? 
Conclusion: In Search of a Politics of Possibility
In tracing the Lockean foundations upon which 
identity and difference rest in a select group of pivot-
al Canadian anti-discrimination cases, I have partially 
mapped out what happens to intersectionality when 
it is incorporated into an institutional context that is 
tethered to the logic of inclusion as an expression of co-
lonial modernity. Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and 
Leslie McCall (2013), however, argue that critiques of 
intersectionality that claim that it reifies identity catego-
ries distort identity politics. They argue that such nar-
row interpretations of intersectionality are unnecessar-
ily preoccupied with who people are as opposed to how 
things work (797). But, as I have demonstrated here, 
this is exactly what happens to intersectionality when 
it goes to court in Canada.  This is done by reproduc-
ing the Lockean nominal essences in a way that ends up 
performing the same social role that biology plays in re-
ductionist and deterministic accounts of both race and 
gender. In so doing, bodies become not only the objects 
of inquiry in these kinds of cases, but also the causes 
of the discrimination. Because the grounds were creat-
ed to provide a framework through which to articulate 
difference, a politics of inclusion in this context is very 
much a kind of assimilation strategy whereby difference 
becomes manageable through the production of what 
Benedict Anderson (1983) has referred to as a “human 
landscape of perfect visibility” (185).
So where does all this managing of difference 
get us if, as Jessica Yee (2011) has pointed out, just be-
cause we have fancy new language like intersectionality 
in our talk, it doesn’t mean that anything changes in our 
walk? In her analysis of feminist challenges to intersec-
tionality, Puar (2012) articulates that “[d]ifference now 
precedes and defines identity” (55). In Canadian an-
ti-discrimination law, this is, in fact, a doctrinal feature 
of the grounds approach. Following Rey Chow (2006), 
Puar (2012) also argues that the endless production of 
new subjects of inquiry through the creation of differ-
ence “has become a universalizing project that is always 
beholden to the self-referentiality of the centre” (55). 
In the context of Canadian anti-discrimination law, the 
centre that Puar is writing about is John Locke’s singu-
lar and unified self-aware human entity. This human is 
separable from other living beings due to its capacity to 
reason through abstraction and its ability to transcend 
those markings that remind it of its own bestial mortali-
ty. Every grievance that is articulated on the basis of dif-
ference, whether intersectional or not, is therefore be-
holden to this unarticulated centre through comparison 
to it as part of a process of inclusion. The body marked 
by identity in this institutional context is not a relation, 
a doing, or an event. It is an object. It is a thing that can 
stand in for others of like kind at the same time as it is 
rendered distinct from its ideal type.
Just as I have shown in the context of the McIvor 
(2009) and Corbiere (1999) cases, where litigants chal-
lenged the Indian Act, exclusion is multiplied infinitely 
“in order to promote inclusion” into the Canadian pol-
ity through dispossession (Puar 2012, 55; Stote 2015). 
This inclusion, however, is inherently asymetrical and 
reproductive of racialized and gendered status hierar-
chies whereby those bodies marked by their difference 
exist on an additive continuum of problems that need to 
be solved. Here Brah and Phoenix’s (2004) insight that 
identities are not objects, but are rather “processes con-
stituted in and through power relations” (277), is an apt 
description of the way that the Lockean legal ontology 
that is deployed through the grounds approach impos-
es presumptions about the body, identity, diversity, and 
difference that reify modernist, unified, self-referential 
subjects in anti-discrimination cases in Canada.  But 
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this way of understanding identity is not unique to this 
setting. 
These cases and this Lockean legal ontology raise 
many of the old feminist questions and debates around 
the category woman, the idea of “woman’s voice,” the 
concept of ‘sisterhood,’ and the existence of woman-on-
ly spaces. Recent critiques have pointed to connections 
between land dispossession and settler feminisms that 
“claim space and each others’ bodies” (Cruz 2011, 52). 
In relation to gendered space, Louis Esme Cruz (2011) 
argues that claiming men-only and women-only space 
reifies binary essentialist constructions of sex and gen-
der (52). For Cruz, this “encourages invasion and con-
quest” through territorial claims and exclusions (53). 
Cruz argues that the creation of these spaces “seems a 
lot like how land is manhandled as a resource that only 
some get to benefit from” in settler colonial contexts 
(52).  
In addition, the cases and the Lockean legal on-
tology examined here point to the value of feminist 
critiques of liberal and Marxist feminisms that remain 
rooted in the modernist theoretical and philosophical 
traditions of the European Enlightenment (Brah and 
Phoenix 2004, 82). John Locke is often hailed as the fa-
ther of liberalism and was “a major influence on the rise 
of materialism in both Britain and France” (Locke 2008, 
xl). His theories set the stage for many different ways 
of thinking, including the English and Scottish theories 
of political economy that would later influence Marx 
and the social constructivist ideas of identity like those 
found in some feminist theories. So what possibilities 
might emerge in the liminal space that follows this dis-
illusioned re-telling of what keeps returning?   
Puar (2012) proposes that the concept of assem-
blage might help to “de-privilege the human body as a 
discrete organic thing” by rendering perfectly delimit-
able sociological objects like the body, identity, and its 
many categories hazy and indeterminate (57). But, given 
the Lockean calculus that is central to the law and pol-
icy frameworks I have examined here, is anti-discirmi-
nation law immovable? Would assemblage become yet 
another category in the proliferation of differences? Or 
perhaps the question ought to be reframed: if, as in Félix 
Guatarri’s (2009) elaboration of the category class or the 
class struggle, assemblage prevents clearly mapped out 
categories, how can assemblage transform epistemolo-
gies and ontologies that consider identity as perfectly 
delimitable? That manage difference on the basis of im-
mutable characteristics?  I propose that it can inspire 
analytic moves that refuse all final closures. What Brah 
and Phoenix (2004), following Ngugi Wa Thiongo 
(1986), characterize as the skill of a “decolonized mind” 
(2004, 77).
In Puar’s (2012) assessment of intersectionality 
and assemblage, she creates a cartography that eludes 
reductionist formulations of intersectionality. She re-
formulates intersectionality in a way that is very much 
in keeping with Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall’s (2013) 
characterization of it as a way of interrogating how 
things work. Unlike the fixed and immovable objects 
that appear in Canadian anti-discrimination claims, 
following Crenshaw (1989), Puar (2012) situates inter-
sectionality as an event, an encounter, an accident, in 
fact (59). Therefore, following her reading of assem-
blage and intersectionality together, the fusion of the 
two is not so much a solution to any of what might look 
like contradictions, inconsistencies, or colluding op-
positions in the conceptualization and deployment of 
intersectionality examined here. Nor is it a resolution 
of the distortions that occur when intersectionality is 
institutionalized. It is rather an invitation to create more 
complex cartographies that are irreducible to identity 
that challenge how things work in sites of institutional 
power and beyond.
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